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ABSTRACT This paper formulates a reciprocal market model of international duopoly
with network externalities to reconsider welfare effects of reductions in transport costs and
tariffs. Depending on the magnitude of network externalities, we show two possibilities.
One of them, which emerges under strong network externalities, illustrates that freer
trade unambiguously improves welfare for any initial level of trade barriers. This finding
provides an affirmative evaluation of freer trade.
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1 Introduction
One of the outstanding trends of the modern economy is a rapid growth of network
industries, e.g., the internet and communications services. This fact generates a large
literature on network externalities mainly in industrial organization.1 Among others, Katz
and Shapiro (1985) are possibly the first to incorporate network externalities into an
oligopoly model. Using a similar model, Economides (1996) shows that incumbent firms
can benefit from an increase in the number of firms in the industry.
Based on these developments in industrial organization, there has been a litera-
ture identifying implications of network externalities for international trade.2 Extending
Economides’ (1996) model to a two-country world, Kikuchi and Kobayashi (2007) show
the profitability of the opening of trade in the presence of network externalities. Yano
and Dei (2006) find an intriguing role of network externalities, demonstrating that dis-
crete demand shift leads a monopolistic firm to charge price below marginal cost under
network externalities. Furthermore, allowing for a foreign competitor in a Katz-Shapiro
(1985) model, Ji and Daitoh (2008) consider how network externalities affect the optimal
subsidy for an interconnection investment. While these studies clarify important aspects
of network externalities in international trade, none of them addresses welfare effects of
trade liberalization. Extending Farrel and Saloner’s (1992) model, Klimenko (2009a, b)
examines compatibility policies in an open economy.3
This paper reconsiders welfare effects of reductions in transport costs and import
tariffs under network externalities by combining the Katz-Shapiro (1985) model with a
reciprocal market model.4 Within this framework, we find that the presence of network
externalities has a considerable influence on welfare effects of reductions in transport
costs and tariffs. Concretely, we show two possibilities. The first, which arises under
mild network effects, establishes a non-monotonic relationship between welfare and trade
barriers. This is nothing new since the existing literature has already obtained it. In
contrast, in the second case with strong network effects, reductions in trade barriers
monotonically and unambiguously improve welfare. This is because less costly trade
expands the network size, which favorably affects not only consumers but also oligopolistic
firms. This affirmative evaluation of freer trade holds for any degree of compatibility
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between the two countries’ network.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model. Sections 3 and 4
deal with the case of transport costs and tariffs, respectively. Section 5 concludes our
discussion.
2 A Model
The model we develop is a straightforward combination of Katz and Shapiro (1985) and
Brander and Krugman (1983). Consider two symmetric countries (Home and Foreign),
two goods (Goods 1 and 2) and one factor (labor). All the Foreign variables are asterisked
to distinguish them from the Home variables. Good 2 (numeraire) is produced with a
unitary input coefficient so that the wage rate is internationally unity. The markets of
Good 1 are segmented and duopolized by a Home firm (firm X) and a Foreign firm (firm
Y). Each firm has an identically constant marginal cost c ≥ 0 and exporting is costly due
to a specific trade barrier τ , which is either a transport cost or an import tariff.5
Consumption of Good 1 exhibits a network externality and we employ Katz and
Shapiro’s (1985) formulation. In Home, there is a mass of consumers uniformly dis-
tributed in a closed interval [0, a] each of whom chooses to buy either one unit of Good 1
or none. When consumer r ∈ [0, a] purchases Good 1 from the Home firm (resp. Foreign
firm), she derives utility of r+bZ−p (resp. r+bZ∗−p∗), where r is consumer r’s intrinsic
utility and Z (resp. Z∗) is a network size associated with the Home (resp. Foreign) good.
The parameter b ≥ 0 measures the degree of network externalities. Hence, if both firms
are active, we have r + bZ − p = r + bZ − p∗. Defining p− bZ = p∗ − bZ = p˜, consumer
r is willing to buy Good 1 if and only if r − p˜ ≥ 0 since purchasing nothing yields zero
utility. Thus, any consumer r ≥ p˜ purchases Good 1 and the resulting aggregate demand
in Home becomes
∫ a
p˜ 1dr = a− p˜. Denoting the Home (resp. Foreign) firm’s supply into
the Home market by x (resp. y), the market-clearing condition in Home is a− p˜ = x+ y,
which is inverted to get an inverse demand function: p = a + bZ − x − y. Foreign’s
counterpart is similarly obtained as p∗ = a + bZ∗ − x∗ − y∗. Given these assumptions,
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consumer surplus in Home is computed as∫ a
p˜
(r − p˜) dr = a
2
2
− ap˜+ p˜
2
2
=
a2
2
− a(a− x− y) + (a− x− y)
2
2
=
(x+ y)2
2
, (1)
where the second equality comes from the market-clearing condition. Similarly, Foreign’s
consumer surplus is (x∗ + y∗)2/2.
From the underlying assumptions, the profits of firms X and Y, pi and pi∗, are defined
by
pi = (a+ bZ − c− x− y)x+ (a+ bZ∗ − c− τ − x∗ − y∗)x∗
pi∗ = (a+ bZ − c− τ − x− y)y + (a+ bZ∗ − c− x∗ − y∗)y∗
The model comprises two stages. In the first stage, consumers form an expectation
over Z and Z∗. Given the predetermined expectations of Z and Z∗, firms X and Y choose
outputs in a Cournot-Nash fashion in the second stage. To solve this model, let us first
consider the last stage. In choosing outputs, firms take Z and Z∗ as given so that the
first-order conditions are obtained as6
∂pi
∂x
= a+ bZ − c− 2x− y = 0
∂pi
∂x∗
= a+ bZ∗ − c− τ − 2x∗ − y∗ = 0
∂pi∗
∂y
= a+ bZ − c− τ − x− 2y = 0
∂pi∗
∂y∗
= a+ bZ∗ − c− x∗ − 2y∗ = 0.
In the first stage, consumers form an expectation over Z and Z∗. We assume that the
Home and Foreign products are partially compatible such that Z = x + x∗ + θ(y + y∗)
and Z∗ = θ(x+ x∗) + y+ y∗, where θ ∈ [0, 1] measures the compatibility of products. By
definition, θ = 0 (resp. θ = 1) corresponds to full incompatibility (resp. compatibility).
Substituting these definitions into the above system of equations and solving for outputs,
the equilibrium outputs are
x = y∗ =
a− c+ (1− b− bθ)τ
3− 2b− 2bθ (2)
x∗ = y =
a− c− (2− b− bθ)τ
3− 2b− 2bθ . (3)
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At this stage, we make an assumption to guarantee the stability of the Nash equilibrium:
Assumption. 3− 2b− 2bθ > 0 or equivalently b+ bθ < 3
2
.
From (2) and (3), together with the assumption of symmetry between countries,
we can exclusively focus on Home without loss of generality. It is easy to show that
the maximized profit of firm X equals x2 + x∗2. The next sections make use of these
preliminaries to evaluate welfare effects of reductions in transport costs/tariffs.
3 Transport Costs and Welfare
This section presumes that τ is a transport cost, from which the Home welfare W consists
of consumer surplus and firm X’s profits:
W (τ) =
(x+ y)2
2
+ x2 + x∗2
=
1
2
[
2(a− c)− τ
3− 2b− 2bθ
]2
+
[
a− c+ (1− b− bθ)τ
3− 2b− 2bθ
]2
+
[
a− c− (2− b− bθ)τ
3− 2b− 2bθ
]2
=
[4(b+ bθ)2 − 12(b+ bθ) + 11] τ 2 − 8(a− c)τ + 8(a− c)2
2(3− 2b− 2bθ)2 . (4)
The rest of our task is to carefully examine the properties of W (·). Note first that the
coefficient to τ 2 in (4) is positive. Taking this into account, differentiating (4) with respect
to τ yields
W ′(τ) =
[4(b+ bθ)2 − 12(b+ bθ) + 11] τ − 4(a− c)
(3− 2b− 2bθ)2 (5)
W ′′(τ) =
4(b+ bθ)2 − 12(b+ bθ) + 11
(3− 2b− 2bθ)2 > 0.
Since the second derivative is positive, W (·) is strictly convex, but we have two possibil-
ities on the dependence of W (·) on τ . To make clear this, evaluating (5) at τ = 0 and
τ = τ , where τ denotes the prohibitive transport cost which is computed by setting (3)
to zero: τ = (a− c)/(2− b− bθ). Substituting τ = 0 and τ = τ , we have
W ′(0) =
−4(a− c)
(3− 2b− 2bθ)2 < 0
W ′(τ) =
(1− 2b− 2bθ)(a− c)
(3− 2b− 2bθ)(2− b− bθ) .
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Therefore, W (·) is negatively-sloped at τ = 0 while the slope of W (·) at τ can be both
positive and negative. The above expression allows us to know that W ′(τ) > 0 if and
only if b+ bθ < 1/2.
The next task is to check welfare levels under free trade (τ = 0) and autarky (τ = τ).
Substituting τ = 0 and τ = τ into (4), they are respectively obtained as
W (0) =
8(a− c)2
2(3− 2b− 2bθ)2
W (τ) =
3(a− c)2
2(2− b− bθ)2 .
Taking the ratio between these two yields
W (0)
W (τ)
=
8(2− b− bθ)2
3(3− 2b− 2bθ)2 .
Subtracting the denominator from the numerator yields −4(b+bθ)2 +4(b+bθ)+5, which
is positive under Assumption made above. Therefore, free trade necessarily leaves both
countries better off than autarky.
Summarizing the results obtained above, the welfare effects of transport cost reduc-
tions are formally stated as follows.
Proposition 1.
If b+ bθ is small enough to have b+ bθ < 1/2, W (τ) takes a U-shape and hence transport
cost reductions may harm welfare (Figure 1). In contrast, if b + bθ is large enough to
have 3/2 > b + bθ > 1/2, W (τ) is monotonically decreasing for any τ ∈ [0, τ ], namely, a
reduction in transport costs necessarily entails welfare gains (Figure 2).7
The intuitions behind this result are as follows. For this purpose, we note that welfare
effects of transport cost reductions are decomposed as follows. First, trade promotes
competition between the firms and contributes to increasing consumer surplus. Second,
reductions in trade barriers make foreign entry easier and hence a part of the domestic
firm’s profit is shifted abroad. This has a negative welfare effect. Third, a reduction in
transport costs inevitably induces more wastes of resources in the case of transport costs,
which is welfare-reducing. Fourth, the procompetitive effect serves to expand the network
size in both countries, which can benefit both the consumers and the oligopolistic firms.
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If the network externality parameter b+ bθ is small enough, the well-known result of
U-shaped welfare is reestablished. If the initial level of transport cost is too high, the
profit-shifting effect and an increase in wasteful resources dominate the other favorable
effects. As a result, transport cost reductions can be harmful. When either reductions
in transport costs are substantial or the initial transport cost is too small, freer trade
benefits welfare since the positive effects outweigh the negative effects.
In contrast, the above ambiguity vanishes if the network externalities are sufficiently
strong. This is because the positive effect triggered by network expansion plays a domi-
nant role in the total welfare effect. Therefore, W (τ) becomes monotonically decreasing
in τ , from which we can conclude that freer trade definitely improves welfare for regardless
of initial levels of transport costs.
4 Tariffs and Welfare
While the previous section regards τ as a transport cost, this section turns to another
case where τ is an import tariff. Despite this difference in interpretations, the task is
substantially the same as that in the transport cost case. We begin by defining welfare
of Home in the present case. All we have to do is to add tariff revenue τy to W (·) in (4).
Then, welfare in the tariff case is
W˜ (τ) = W (τ) + τy
=
[4(b+ bθ)2 − 12(b+ bθ) + 11] τ 2 − 8(a− c)τ + 8(a− c)2
2(3− 2b− 2bθ)2 +
τ [a− c− (2− b− bθ)τ ]
3− 2b− 2bθ
=
−(1− 2b− 2bθ)τ 2 − 2(1 + 2b+ 2bθ)(a− c)τ + 8(a− c)2
2(3− 2b− 2bθ)2 , (6)
where a tilde indicates a tariff case.
As in the case of transport costs, let us differentiate W˜ (·) to get
W˜ ′(τ) =
−(1− 2b− 2bθ)τ − (1 + 2b+ 2bθ)(a− c)
(3− 2b− 2bθ)2 (7)
W˜ ′′(τ) =
−(1− 2b− 2bθ)
(3− 2b− 2bθ)2 . (8)
Unlike the transport cost case, the sign of both W˜ ′(·) and W˜ ′′(·) can be both positive and
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negative depending on the parameters. From (8), we see that W˜ (·) is strictly concave if
and only if b+ bθ < 1/2.
In order to know the slope at two values τ = 0 and τ = τ = (a − c)/(2 − b − bθ),
substituting these into (7) yields
W˜ ′(0) =
−(1 + 2b+ 2bθ)(a− c)
(3− 2b− 2bθ)2 < 0
W˜ ′(τ) =
−(1 + b+ bθ)(a− c)
(3− 2b− 2bθ)(2− b− bθ) < 0.
Accordingly, W˜ (·) is monotonically negatively-sloped for any positive tariff.
The welfare comparison between free trade and autarky in the last section can straight-
forwardly apply to the tariff case because we easily find W (0) = W˜ (0) and W (τ) = W˜ (τ).
Considering these results, the welfare effects of tariff reductions are formally stated in:
Proposition 2.
If b+ bθ is small enough to have b+ bθ < 1/2, W (τ) takes a strictly concave and inverted
U-shape (Figure 3). In contrast, if b + bθ is large enough to have 3/2 > b + bθ > 1/2,
W (τ) is strictly convex in τ (Figure 4). While reductions in tariffs ensure welfare gains,
there exists an import subsidy τ˜ ≡ −(1 + 2b+2bθ)(a− c)/(1−2b−2bθ) which maximizes
joint welfare of both countries in the former subcase.8
Proof. Obvious from the above arguments. From W˜ ′(τ) = 0 in (7), we obtain τ˜ =
−(1 + 2b+ 2bθ)(a− c)/(1− 2b− 2bθ) < 0.
Let us interpret this result intuitively. What makes the tariff case differ from the trans-
port cost case is that the absence of waste of resources. This is because tariff revenue
compensates the losses associated with wasteful trade. Thus, the result is more straight-
forward than the transport cost case. In the tariff case, trade liberalization monotonically
improves welfare regardless of the initial tariff and the network size parameter.
However, it is worth mentioning the subtle difference between the two subcases il-
lustrated in Figures 3 and 4. If the network externality parameter is sufficiently small,
there exists an import subsidy τ˜ which maximizes welfare of both countries. This implies
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that both countries reach the highest welfare if they cooperatively choose τ˜ . On the
other hand, such a welfare-maximizing level of import tariff/subsidy does not exist if the
network externality parameter is sufficiently large. Despite this difference, both subcases
commonly predict that trade liberalization is welfare-improving, which can provide an
affirmative rationale for multilateral trade liberalization.
5 Concluding Remarks
Developing a reciprocal dumping model of international trade with network externalities,
we have illustrated how the presence of network externalities influences gains from re-
ductions in transport costs and import tariffs. When the network effects are sufficiently
strong, they prove to benefit welfare in an unambiguous and monotonic fashion. This
is mainly because expansion in network sizes positively affects welfare and dominates
the other negative effects through profit-shifting and wasteful resources. In view of the
growing presence of network industries in modern world trade, our results have certain
relevance on considering welfare effects of international trade. However, we admittedly
recognize that our analysis has been based on a number of simplifying assumptions. It is
our future research agenda to elaborate our results in a more general setting.
Notes
1. See Shy (2001) for a formal definition of network externalities. For recent developments
in literature, see, for example, Farrell and Klemperer (2007).
2. While we adopt an oligopolistic model, some predecessors employ a monopolistically
competitive model, e.g., Harris (1998), Kikuchi (2002, 2003) and Kikuchi and Ichikawa
(2002).
3. We should comment that Krishna (1988) is the first to incorporate network externalities
into the models of oligopolistic trade. She makes clear how network externalities affect
the effects of unilateral adoption of trade policies.
4. See, among others, Brander (1981) and Brander and Krugman (1983).
5. We allow for negativity of τ (import subsidy) in the tariff case.
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6. The second-order conditions are satisfied.
7. Trade gains are ensured in the marginal case in which b+ bθ = 1/2 as well.
8. W˜ (τ) becomes negatively linear in the special case of b+ bθ = 1/2.
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Figure 1: Transport cost case (1)
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Figure 2: Transport cost case (2)
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Figure 3: Tariff case (1)
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Figure 4: Tariff case (2)
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